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Abstract 
We may freely state that taxes bear two-sided nature. The first one and that is the good side of their essence is 
all about their role in contemporary public finance, sustaining the financial health of the modern-day state if 
properly managed. The second more menacing nature that occupies the interest of this article attributes to 
economic efficiency and the relatively high potential of taxes to disrupt the activities of economic participants, 
and the possibility to create a deadweight loss in the economy. Tax distortions are common for all the different 
groups of taxes, but for the corporate taxes are exceptionally evident. For example, one of the most typical is the 
distortion of corporate finance, when the choice for the financial alternative of the investment project is made. 
Induced by the traditional, “classical” treatment of corporate profit, according to which interest payments are 
deductible from the corporate income tax base, the debt source of finance is commonly considered as tax 
preferred as compared to the equity source of finance, which is oppositely fully taxed in most of the cases. This 
will provoke unusual behavior of the company, to rely more on borrowed capital, thus increasing the chances of 
insolvency and business failure. To eliminate the debt-equity distortions, the leading economic organizations 
have recommended lately, some alternative forms of corporate tax systems that preserve relative capacities to 
offset the excessive burden on the external equity supported investments. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
* Corresponding author.  
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 The Allowance for Equity Tax system is such a proposal of the OECD. It comes in 2 basic forms, the 
Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax system (ACE), a model from the Croatian experience and the Allowance 
for Shareholders Equity Tax system (ASE), known as the “Nordic” form of corporate tax. The intention of this 
article is to explore their properties from the view of neutrality and the allocation criteria and compare the 
findings with the Classical Corporation Tax (CCT), for which purpose the basic methodology of EMTR is 
additionally modified and extended. We hope to prove that these solutions represent solid alternatives for the 
“classical” approach in corporate taxation if the goals for neutrality and economic efficiency are concerned.  
Keywords: corporate income tax; cost of capital; effective marginal tax rate; classical corporation tax; debt; new 
equity issues; double taxation.  
JEL Classification Numbers: H25, H32, D92 
1. Introduction 
Recently, we’ve described and explained the distortions that usually arise from the isolated implementation of 
corporate taxes, a condition which assumes total abstraction of the personal taxes. In this article, we also include 
the personal taxes in our analysis, with intention to explore the investment decision, not only from the 
company’s perspective, but from the shareholder’s point of view as well, a condition commonly referred as 
“double taxation”. This phenomenon is granted to fact that the corporate tax base (i.e. the corporate income) 
cannot be limited only at the corporation observed as a form of legal entity. Usually, under the classical 
corporation tax regime, after the initial taxation at corporate level, corporate profits are distributed to the 
shareholders in a form of dividends, capital gains or interest payments, and are subject to additional taxation at 
personal level.  
The ultimate consequence of the referred phenomenon is imposition of an additional “extra” burden on total 
corporate profit expressed integrally from its source to its destination. Respecting that this “excessive” taxation 
of the profit is considered unfair and could distort the economic activity of firms, the authorities try to construct 
more appropriate “neutral” tax systems with attributions to effectively tax the economic rents (or the extra 
profit) and at the same time avoid taxation of the normal return. In addition, we give a brief literature review to 
some integrated modalities of corporate tax systems with the desired properties that actually allow a higher 
degree of neutrality in corporate taxation. The following tax systems are protagonists proposals of the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), as a part of the tax reform that was undergone 
recently. Acknowledged as more convenient to eliminate the difference between debt and equity associated with 
the “classical” approach in corporate taxation, they are: the Full Integration Tax System (FIT), the Allowance 
for Corporate Equity Tax System (ACE), the Allowance for Shareholders Equity Tax System (ASE), the 
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) etc. 
It is a frequently known truth that borrowed capital is a superior source of finance from the taxpayer’s point of 
view, as a result of the usual and widely excepted treatment of interest payments. In practice, since companies 
are allowed to deduct interest payments from their corporate income tax base, the system subsidizes the debt 
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source finance in a manner that the action reduces the opportunity cost (the discount rate) of the debt-financed 
investment. This gives a certain advantage to the debt finance, since it is tax preferred in front of equity, which 
oppositely is fully taxed. The last triggers unfavorable behavior of the company, to use more borrowed capital, 
thus increasing the risk of bankruptcy and insolvency of the firm. This presents the most common and typical 
distortion of corporate finance, induced by the traditional, “classical” treatment of corporate profit. But, as 
mentioned above, the leading economic organizations such as the OECD, have made a break-through in the 
sphere of business taxation, proposing some alternative models of hybrid tax systems, that are much or less 
distinctive from the “classical” approach and more evenly allocate the burden across the different sources of 
finance, for example such as the concept of the Allowance for Equity Tax system. The idea was to create equal 
“symmetric” treatment between debt and equity within the corporate income tax regime, therefore under the 
Allowance for Equity Tax system companies can deduct an imputed normal return on their equity from the 
corporate income tax base or the personal (shareholders) income tax base parallel to the deduction for interest on 
debt. According to this, the concept could be found in 2 basic forms. The first one is the Allowance for 
Corporate Equity Tax system (ACE), a model from the Croatian experience, and the second one is the 
Allowance for Shareholders Equity Tax system, which is known as the “Nordic” model of corporate tax. If 
implemented properly, regardless the form of this concept, the result should be neutrality and indifference 
between debt and equity.  
The intention of this article is to explore and test the technical properties of the ACE and the ASE tax from the 
view of neutrality and the allocation criteria and compare the findings with the Classical Corporation Tax 
(CCT), for which purpose the methodology of EMTR is effectively utilized. The significance of the CCT 
system, which is widely considered as a classical example model of the pure “double” taxation of corporate 
income, is based on the fact that it can be employed as a benchmark model for the function of comparison and 
measurement against the alternative systems intended to be analyzed here. For that reason, we only introduce it 
briefly, before we move on with the analysis of the referred systems.  
2. Modifying the basic methodological frame 
We pay our attention in this from the following series of articles, exclusively on the investments financed with 
new equity issues (external equity). As we know from business practice, equities could be found in 2 (two) 
fundamental forms: external equity (new equity issues), which provides the equity capital for the ongoing 
projects externally, through issues of the new company’s shares on the capital market; and retained earnings 
(retentions of profit), which are formed from the company’s accumulated (non-distributed) profit, usually 
subject of reinvestment. The models of taxation discussed in this article, could be easily applied in the 
investment scenario covered with retained earnings as well, of course modified with its specific circumstances. 
With the purpose to achieve more detailed, systematic approach in exploration of the attributions and 
specificities of the models, we decided to study them separately, and dedicate this article only for the new equity 
finance. Other reasons for this are the limited space, minimizing the risk for confusion, and providing a better 
comparison of the effects. The basic methodology is consisted of the effective marginal tax rates analytical 
frame (EMTR), which is additionally modified and extended to express all the newly occurred conditions that 
define “double” taxation of corporate profit. With the adapted methodology of EMTR, we have managed to 
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identify and explain multiple varieties of integrated systems with relative (theoretical) capacities to generate 
more neutral taxation on the external equity-supported investment. Here, we present only the ACE and the ASE 
tax and compare it with the basic model of the CCT. 
As already mentioned, preferably, the measurements of tax rates should be expressed at marginal level, because 
the focus of this research is put on the allocation criteria. According to King & Fullerton, the effective marginal 
tax rate could be defined as a ratio between the tax wedge and the pre-tax rate of return [1]: 
p
spEMTR ~
~ −
=            (1) 
Identical concept of the EMTR is also advocated by authors Devereux & Griffith [2], [3], [4]. The methodology 
developed by Devereux & Griffith extended the already existing concept proposed by King & Fullerton, and in 
the following years they refined their approach resulting in a standardized methodology accepted by the most 
economic organizations and institutions (OECD). The effective marginal tax rate on corporate income is defined 
identically as previously mentioned, where p ~ is the cost of capital (the pre-tax rate of return on investment) 
defined as: 
δ
πγ
ρ
π
ππδρ
−
−+
+
−
−+
−++−
=
)1)(1(
)1(
)1)(1(
})1(){1(~
t
F
t
Ap
           
(2) 
Where:  
- Symbol t is the corporate income tax rate; 
- Symbol π is the inflation rate in the current period; 
- Symbol A is the net present value of tax depreciation allowances; 
- Symbol δ is the economic (true) depreciation rate; 
- Symbol γ is the tax discrimination variable developed to measure tax discrimination between the equity 
retentions and the equity distributions. Under the condition of absence of personal taxes, this variable’s value is 
1 (γ = 1), but in presence of the personal taxes the variable’s value differ from 1. If we consider md to be the 
personal tax rate on dividend income, z the effective personal tax rate on capital gains and c the tax credit rate 
allowed for dividends paid, then in the case of implementation of personal taxes, the tax discrimination variable 
requires the form of: 
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cz
md
−−
−
=γ
           
(3)  
- Symbol ρ is known as the shareholders discount rate, which in absence of personal taxes generates value equal 
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to the nominal interest rate (ρ = i). Now, if we consider mi as the personal tax rate on interest income, since the 
personal taxes are involved, the shareholders discount rate receives the form: 
i
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(4) 
- Symbol F from the expression above represents the financial constraints variable and its value is determined 
according to the source of finance. For instance, if the project is financed through new equity issues, than the 
financial constraints variable FNE is measured as: 
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And if the firm borrows external debt (bonds or bank loans) to finance its project, in that case the financial 
constraints variable FDE is calculated as: 
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In order to isolate the pure effects that arise from the imposition of the code, as well as to simplify the 
calculation for the purpose of a better illustration of the effects, once again, we suggest the following 
assumptions: the net-present value of depreciation allowances is assumed 0 (A = 0), there is no inflation in the 
economy (π = 0, ρ = r), the rate of economic depreciation is assumed 0 (δ = 0) and the real interest rate is 
positive (r > 0).  
 
Considering the previous assumptions, than expression (4) for the shareholder’s discount rate will be 
transformed to: 
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While expression (2) for the cost of the capital will be rearranged to: 
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2.1. The investment tax wedge coefficient 
Before we proceed, we’d like to refer to our main analytical tool, and that is, the investment tax wedge 
coefficient. Precisely, the element from the EMTR (p~ - s), the tax wedge, can be divided into 2 parts: a) the 
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investment tax wedge and b) the savings tax wedge [5]. The second term is measured as (r – s) and it represents 
the effective tax burden on the saver’s income, which is irrelevant for the analysis. The first term which is 
crucial for our research is measured as a difference between the investor’s rate of return before taxes (the cost of 
capital) and the real interest rate (p~ – r) and it’s an expression for the effective tax burden on the investor’s (or 
company’s) capital income. Depending on the relation between p~ and r, we can distinct 3 different conditions. 
The first condition is when the effective tax burden is positive (p~> r) and as a result of that, the tax system 
depresses the investment activities. In terms of integrated taxation of company‘s income, this means that both, 
the economic rent and the normal return are effectively taxed. The second condition is when the effective tax 
burden is equal to 0 (p~ = r), when the tax system is neutral to the investment decision. In other words, under 
these conditions, the normal return of corporate profit is left from taxation and only the extra profit is being 
subject to taxation. And the third and the most preferable condition from the investor’s point of view is when the 
effective tax burden is negative (p~< r), when the tax system supports the overall investment. Here, the 
investment is being effectively „subsidized“ by the system, enabling the investor to legally escape from taxation 
a rate of return higher than the normal rate of return. In perfect economies without presence of taxes, the cost of 
capital is identical with the real interest rate (p~= r) and the economic agents are completely indifferent between 
the investment decision and the decision to save. The existence of the national tax system diverges the 
difference between the cost of the capital and the interest rate and therefore creates a positive tax wedge (p~> r). 
2.2. Recalling to the effects from the sole implementation of corporation tax 
In order to create foundation for comparison and differentiation between the effects, we briefly recall on the 
possible outcomes from the scenario where the corporate tax is solely, individually applied on capital income, 
without any presence of the personal taxes. As it has been described, the isolated implementation of corporate 
income tax creates uneven distribution of the burden across the different sources of finance (see Table 3 from 
below). The investment tax wedge on the debt-financed investment is measured as: 
0~ =− rp                                  (9) 
While for the equity-financed investment, it received the form of:  
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Usually, all equity-financed investments, regardless their form, are more discriminated against the investments 
covered with debt. The first ones are levied with a positive effective tax burden that is determined in proportion 
of the level of corporate income tax rate t. At the other alternative, the zero burden on investment indicates on 
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the presence of neutrality in taxation.  
2.3. The cost of capital in each investment alternative 
And finally, we derive the cost of capital for each investment alternative under the conditions that require 
simultaneous implementation of the corporate and the personal income tax, with the help of equation (8).  For 
that reason, first we’ll consider a hypothetical investment project financed with external debt. Adequately, 
equation (6) for the financial constraints variable in the case of debt-financed investment is inserted in equation 
(8) for the general expression of the cost of capital, from which we will obtain: 
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Accordingly from this, the investment tax wedge in the analyzed investment alternative will be: 
0~ =−=− rrrp            (13) 
A conclusion is drawn that, if the overall integrated effect from the corporate and the personal tax is observed, in 
every case when the investment project is financed with external debt, regardless the existing form of 
corporation tax, the system will be neutral to the investment decision, ceteris paribus. The introduction of 
personal taxes do not affect these investments in a different way rather than the case of isolated application of 
the corporation tax, so it is evident that the „double“ taxation effect is not present here. All deterministic 
elements that include the personal taxes, in first order, the tax discrimination variable γ and the shareholder 
discount rate ρ cancel each other in the equation, producing a zero value investment tax wedge. 
The situation is much different if we bring the equity source of finance in our analysis. In order to isolate the 
most important factor for the investment decision in this financial alternative, term (5) for the financial 
constraints variable in the case of equity-financed investment is inserted in term (8) for the cost of capital: 
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Term (14) is the general form of the cost of capital in the case of investment financed with new equity issues. It 
resolves that the most dominant factors influencing the marginal investment in this scenario: the shareholder’s 
discount rate ρ, the corporate income tax rate t and the tax discrimination variable γ. Except the corporate tax 
rate, the other parameters include the components of the personal income tax, specifically the capital income tax 
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(the personal tax rate on interest income mi, the personal tax rate on dividend income md, the effective personal 
tax rate on capital gains income z, and the tax credit rate on dividends paid c). This will be utilized furtherly, to 
extract and analyze the properties of the different tax systems from the view of neutrality and the allocation 
criteria, first in the case of the Classical Corporation tax and after in the cases of the ACE and the ASE tax 
system.  
3. The Classical Corporation Tax System (CCT) 
Now, we introduce in brief the so-called „classical“ approach in corporate taxation, which has been traditionally 
the most used and widely practiced form of corporation tax. The intention is to complete only a short referral of 
technical properties of the CCT system, thus it will serve as a baseline model for comparison of the other 
systems discussed furtherly. 
Basically, the CCT represents a rudimentary form of corporate tax that treats the corporate income in a 
conservative and fundamental way. It’s a system of taxing companies in which the company is treated as a 
taxable entity separate from its own shareholders. The profits of companies under this system are therefore taxed 
twice, first when made by the company and again when distributed to the shareholders as dividends and capital 
gains. Accordingly, in the essence of the Classical Corporation Tax is double taxation of corporate income. 
Speaking in technical terms, a Classical System makes no allowance for “double” taxation, so that dividend 
income is subject to corporate income tax and taxed again as personal income [6].  The authorities impose the 
corporate tax at the corporate level differently from the personal taxes at the stockholder level and at the same 
time do not allow any tax credit on dividend distributions (c = 0). Usually, the combination of the levels 
(percentage points) of the different tax rates falls under discretion of the policy maker. Considering this, we can 
identify the CCT system as (t, md, mi, z, c = 0).  
CCT in debt-financed alternatives. It is easy recognized that the CCT produces a zero investment tax wedge 
variable if we take in account expression (13) from where we see that the cost of capital in this investment 
alternative is equal to the real interest rate: 
0~ =−=− rrrp                              (15) 
CCT in equity-financed alternatives. The implications of the conditions of the classical system in this 
alternative is initially found in the tax discrimination variable γ: 
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Including the equations (16) and (4) in term (14), the cost of capital will become: 
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And finally the investment tax wedge will transform to: 






−
−−
−
=−
−−
−
=− 1
)1)(1(
)1(
)1)(1(
)1(~
d
i
d
i
mt
mrr
mt
rmrp
           
(18)
 
Consequently, in this case the effects from corporate taxation very often depend on the cross-effects from the 
personal taxation [7]. Expression (15) shows that the investment decision in this basic and most extended 
version of taxation of corporate income is determined largely from the inter-relation between the different 
personal tax rates (mi and md) and the corporate tax rate t. It is also self-evident, as we can see from the absence 
of symbol z, that the effective personal tax rate on capital income is irrelevant for the present model of taxation. 
The effect from „double“ taxation is quantified with the term (1 – mi)/(1 – t)(1 – md). Actually, it represents the 
combined corporate and personal income tax liability of the CCT, which may have variable values depending on 
the different dimensions of the relevant tax rates imposed by the code. As a general rule, an increase in 
corporate and dividend tax will generally increase liabilities and the burden on investment, while an increase in 
interest income tax will decrease tax obligations and vice versa. For example, if we take the actual situation in 
Macedonia, where mi = 0% (0,00), md= 10% (0,10) and t = 10% (0,10) [8], [9], [10], the combined tax liability 
would be 0,2345 or 23,34% and with real interest rate of 10% (0,10) would yield an effective tax rate on 
investment of 0,0234 or 2,34%. If we assume that an interest income tax of 5% has been introduced lately mi = 
5% (0,05), than the combined tax liability would be 0,1728 or 17,28%, producing an effective tax rate on 
investment of 0,0172 or 1,72%. On the other hand, if the corporate and the dividend tax are increased on 20% t 
= md= 20% (0,20) and mi = 0% (0,00), it is obvious that the investment tax wedge will additionally increase 
even on 0,0562 or 5,62%.  
4. Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax System (ACE) 
Another alternative is the Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax System proposed by Devereux & Sorensen [11] 
and by the Institute for Fiscal Studies [12]. Under the ACE tax system companies are allowed to deduct an 
imputed normal return on their equity from the corporate income tax base, parallel to the deduction for interest 
on debt [13]. This „symmetric“ approach in corporate taxation, should ultimately ensure neutrality between debt 
and equity. The experts suggest that preferably, the allowance on the corporate income tax base should equal the 
nominal interest rate. According to them, this should allow for the normal return on equity to remain tax free, 
while the pure rents and extra profits should stay within the channels of taxation. For example, it is very 
interesting that Croatia has already tested this form of corporate income tax in practice, in the period from 1994 
to the beginning of 2001. The imputed rate of return to equity, denoted as „protective interest“ (PI), was equal to 
5 per cent plus the rate of increase of industrial product prices [14]. In the following text, the effects from the 
implementation of this system are explored. 
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Debt. When the investment project is financed with external debt, the corporate tax system under the ACE 
regime remains neutral to the investment decision. This means that the investment tax wedge will generate value 
of zero, since interest payments are deductible from the tax base.  
New equity issue. It was already mentioned that the usual, normal treatment of the return on equity results with 
a positive investment tax wedge, as presented in expression (10). With introduction of the ACE system, 
companies will be allowed to deduct the normal return on equity from their corporate profit tax base. It is 
thought that the nominal interest rate is a true representation of the normal return on equity, but in our case, that 
would be the real interest rate r, since the inflation rate is assumed 0. The first implication of this measure 
occurs in the term of the shareholder’s discount rate ρ. If the company is allowed to deduct some rate of return 
defined at the level of interest rate, in that case the opportunity cost of equity-financed investment which 
happens to be the holders discount rate, must be corrected, lowered by factor (1 – t): 
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This means that, the tax gain for the company (and the holder ultimately) under the ACE tax comes in a form of 
increased tax depreciation allowances expressed in present value terms, because of the reduced discount rate. 
4.1. Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax System (ACE), with no tax credit available (t, mi= md, c = 0) 
The previous can be illustrated methodologically, first for this version and after for the version with an available 
tax credit: 
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Expression (22) proves the similarities between the ACE system and the Fully Integrated Tax System. It is quite 
obvious that this condition which is determined only by the right of the holder to deduct the normal return, does 
not guarantee the neutrality between debt and equity. To do so, another additional condition must be satisfied 
and that is the equalization of the personal income tax rates (mi = md). Full neutrality requires that taxes at the 
shareholder level are considered as well. If neutrality is achieved at the corporate level and if all returns (interest 
payments, dividends and capital gains) are taxed at the personal level at the same rate, the corporation in a 
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closed-economy setting will be indifferent between debt and equity and between external and internal equity as 
source of finance under the ACE tax system [15]. Accordingly, the full definition of this model of ACE tax 
system could be described as (t, mi= md, c = 0), and if the additional terms are implemented in (22), neutrality of 
the system is symbolically expressed as: 
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4.2. Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax System (ACE), with an available tax credit (t, mi = md, c = t)  
Across the fact that this model of ACE, which allows a certain compensation in a form of credit, steps back 
from the incorporated principal of neutrality, and therefore is not accepted in the practice, we attend to explore it 
here and discover the potential properties within. The relevant methodological changes are presented below step 
by step: 
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And if mi = md: 
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As it is seen from expression (27), here we have a corporate tax system that sustains a negative burden on the 
investment income. The level of the tax-induced benefit in this example is equal to the product of the real 
interest rate r and the corporate income tax rate t. Nevertheless, this effect demands the rudimentary condition of 
a positive corporate tax rate to occur. However, if that is not a case, which is less likely, the benefit from the 
corporate tax will disappear and the system will remain neutral (t = 0, r = 0,10 and  p~ - r = -0,10 x 0,00 = 0). 
To conclude: under the Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax System,  the corporate income tax stops being a 
withholding tax on the normal return on equity-financedinvestment [16]. Introducing the ACE tax system 
effectively removes the tax differences among debt and equity, and produces neutrality similarly to the CBIT 
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system. But, unlike the CBIT system which lifts the smaller, zero wedge of debt finance, equalizing it with the 
higher positive one of equity finance, the ACE tax system does the alleviation in reverse direction. Actually, it 
lowers the positive wedge of equities, bringing it to zero wedge level of debt finance investment. Table 1 
provides illustration of the arising effects from the ACE tax on investment. 
Table 1: Illustration of the possible effects of ACE tax on investment 
ACE tax 
variants 
Example Investment 
tax wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
investment 
Effects on 
normal re-
turn and eco-
nomic rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = md, c = 0 20%, 10%, 10% 0,00% indifferent rent  taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t, mi = md, c = t 20%, 10%, 10% -2,00% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
5. Allowance for Shareholders Equity Tax System (ASE) 
The ASE tax system which was originally introduced by Sorensen [17] represents another hybrid system with 
certain similarities with the previously described ACE tax. But unlikely, the ASE permits a tax-deductible 
allowance for the normal return on equity at the shareholder level instead. It is essentially a “Nordic” model of 
tax firstly implemented in Norway in 2006, under the original name “rate-of-return allowance – RRA”. For the 
personal income tax base at the shareholder level, which consist of dividends and capital gains, the government 
of Norway allows a deduction at the level of RRA, generally equal to the 3 month bonds interest rate. Another 
condition that has to be satisfied across the deductibility of the normal return, is the equivalence among the 
personal tax rate on interest income and the corporate income tax rate (t = mi), if neutrality of the system is 
concerned. This equality might not be required if, instead of implementing an allowance for shareholder equity, 
governments would provide a credit for shareholder equity (CSE) [18], which presents an alternative 
formulation of the same system. It is interesting that, under the ASE, the corporate tax still remains as a 
withholding barrier for both the normal return and the economic rent (not only for the rent as in the case of the 
ACE). Accordingly, the withholding function of corporate tax is being preserved in the case of ASE, as it 
continues to play the role of “backstop” for the personal income tax in whole. 
Debt. There is no difference when the investment project is financed with external debt. Interest  are deductible 
from the tax base, the investment tax wedge is 0 and the corporate tax system under the ASE regime prevails 
neutral to the investment decision. 
New equity issue. The initial impact here, is again within the shareholder’s discount rate ρ. The right to deduct 
an allowed rate of return from the personal income tax base (more precisely, in our case it is the dividend 
income tax base), lowers the opportunity cost of the external-equity investment with factor (1 – md): 
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Apparently, the tax gain under the ASE is identical to the immediate expensing on the dividend income tax base 
measured in present value terms, in amount to the dividend income tax rate at the personal level. 
5.1. Allowance for Shareholder Equity Tax System (ASE), with no tax credit available (t = mi, md, c = 0) 
This true version of ASE is demonstrated methodologically, in the following steps: 
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Analogically, equation (31) refers the resemblance between the ASE and the dividend exemption system, at 
least expressed in mathematical terms. To avoid distortion and secure the neutrality principle in taxation, we 
must add identical tax rates in the last equation (mi = t), thus fully identifying the current model of ASE as (t = 
mi, md, c = 0). If we add the condition mi = t, within the investment tax wedge equation, we can easily observe 
derivation of neutrality as follows: 
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5.2. Allowance for Shareholder Equity Tax System (ASE), with a tax credit available (t = mi, md, c = t) 
Regardless the fact that this model of ASE, allowing an additional compensation in a form of tax credit, is 
barely found in the practice, we briefly investigate the theoretical properties associated with it. The relevant 
methodological changes are presented analogically step by step: 
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And if mi = t: 
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As it is seen from expression (36), here we have another situation when the corporate tax system generates a 
negative burden on the investment income. Repeatedly, the level of tax-induced benefit equals the product of the 
real interest rate r and the corporate income tax rate t (or the personal tax on interest income mi, if the condition 
of t = mi is validated). Again, this effect demands the existence of a positive tax rates. Eventually, under a zero 
corporate and interest tax rate, the tax-induced benefit will diminish and the system will stay neutral (t = mi =0, 
r = 0,10 and p~ - r = -0,10 x 0,00 = 0), a scenario remarkably close to the one from the alternative Dividend 
Exemption Tax System, which is not a subject of discussion here. Table 2 describes the effects from the ASE 
tax on investment. 
Table 2: Illustration of the possible effects of ASE tax on investment 
ASE tax 
variants 
Example Investment 
tax wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
investment 
Effects on 
normal re-
turn and eco-
nomic rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = md, c = 0 20%, 10%, 10% 0,00% indifferent rent  taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t, mi = md, c = t 20%, 10%, 10% -2,00% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
By comparing Table 1 and Table 2, it is easy to detect that the previous two Equity Allowance Systems sustain 
very similar effects concerning the equity-financed investments. In essence, both of them are able to bypass the 
normal return on equity from taxation, leaving under the force of wedge only the economic rent, and both of 
them effectively resolve the differences between equity and debt. Then, what is the dividing line between the 
ACE and the ASE tax system? The answer is in the location specific differences in taxation of corporate income. 
Namely, ACE is a source-based tax allowance while the ASE is a residence-based tax allowance [19]. The first 
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one affects investment income from the source countries, and the second one resident shareholders and capital 
income from the resident countries. Because the residence-oriented ASE requires more complex regulation rules 
concerning the flows of capital and profit repatriation, it is argued also, that the administration costs and the risk 
of evasion are much higher in comparison of the ACE tax system. At the finishing point, the effects from 
taxation on investment performance are summarized in Table 3, and the qualitative attributions of the analyzed 
basic model tax systems are given in Table 4. 
Table 3: The effects from taxation on investment performance 
Only corporate taxes Investment tax wedge (p~ - r) 
Debt  0 
New equity issues  






−
−
1
)1(
1
t
r or
)1( t
rt
−
 
Classical Corporation Tax System (CCT)  
Debt 
)1( t
rt
−
 
New equity issues 






−
−−
− 1
)1)(1(
)1(
d
i
mt
mr  
Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax System (ACE)  
Debt 0 
New equity issues: Basic model of ACE without a tax credit 
(t, mi = md, c = 0) 






−
−
− 1
)1(
)1(
d
i
m
mr when mi = md:    0 
New equity issues: Basic model of ACE with a tax credit 
(t, mi = md, c = t) 
rt−  when t > 0 
Allowance for Shareholder Equity Tax System (ASE)  
Debt 0 
New equity issues: Basic model of ASE without a tax credit 
(t = mi, md, c = 0) 






−
−
− 1
)1(
)1(
t
mr
i
 when t = mi :    0
 
New equity issues: Basic model of ASE with a tax credit 
(t = mi, md, c = t) 
rt−   or  irm−  when t = mi > 0
 
Source: Summary and review of author’s calculations 
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Table 4: Summary of qualitative attributions of basic model tax systems 
Corpora
te tax 
Effects on 
debt  
finance 
Effects on 
new 
equity 
finance 
Effects on 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
normal 
return 
Withhold-
ing 
function 
criteria 
Location 
specific 
criteria 
Overall 
allocation  
criteria 
 
CCT 
 
favors 
 
discrimi-
nates 
 
taxed 
 
taxed 
withholds 
rents and 
normal 
return 
source and 
residence-
based 
 
distortive 
 
ACE 
 
indifferent 
 
indifferent 
 
taxed 
 
not taxed 
 
Withholds 
only rents 
 
source- 
based 
 
neutral 
 
ASE 
 
indifferent 
 
indifferent 
 
taxed 
 
not taxed 
withholds 
rents and 
normal 
return 
 
 residence-
based 
 
neutral 
Source: Author’s interpretations 
6. Conclusion 
The proposals of the OECD examined here, such as, the Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax System (ACE) 
and the Allowance for Shareholders Equity Tax System (ASE), indeed performed satisfactory in the terms of 
neutrality in contrast to the traditional Classical Corporation Tax System (CCT). According to the results on the 
investment tax wedge coefficient, derived from the completed analysis, present similar effects concerning the 
equity-financed investments. Basically, both of the systems do not discriminate equity in favor of debt and both 
of them are able to omit the normal return on equity while simultaneously tax the economic rent. Distinction 
between the Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax and the Allowance for Shareholders Equity Tax is found  in 
the location specific differences in taxation of corporate income. Specifically, the source-based ACE affects 
investment income from the source countries, and the residence-oriented ASE the capital income from the 
resident countries. Complex regulation rules in the case of residence-oriented ASE increase the agency costs and 
at the same time worsen the control of capital flows, consequently enabling loopholes and possibilities for 
evasion.  Also, the withholding function of corporate tax is being preserved in the case of ASE, as it continues to 
play the role of “backstop” for the personal income tax, while in the case of ACE the same constatation could 
not be generalized. 
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